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Abstract: As has often been noted, BACHELARD's counter-intuitive orientation to scientific inquiry, 
with its rationalizing insistence on relational anti-essentialism, has profound implications for social 
research methodology. The question remains how this orientation might inform the actual practice 
of research. In this article we present a pragmatic response, one that emphasizes the need to 
scrupulously avoid the use of essentialized categories. Doing so involves much work and constant 
vigilance, for which technique is an absolute requirement. Our reading of BACHELARD therefore 
insists that productive research requires the artifice of a methodological technology that wrenches 
research from self-evidence whilst avoiding its ossification in theory. We argue that this continuous 
disruption and rebuilding of forms of thought is necessary but often neglected in social research; 
often simply because suitable technology is unavailable. By developing work by DOWLING (1998, 
2009, 2013), we then suggest one that is. This is demonstrated by contrasting a diagrammatic 
technology known for only breaking weakly with established categories—BECKER's classification 
of deviance—with a relational space that achieves the rational artifice required (one in fact more 
consistent with BECKER's own pragmatic project). The value of the artifice a relational space 
achieves is then illustrated in the empirical context of digital file-sharing.
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1. Introduction
In recent decades, BACHELARD's work has had considerable significance in the 
philosophy of science (LECOURT, 2001; RHEINBERGER, 2010a, 2010b; 
STADLER, 2010). It has also been of profound importance in the development of 
methodological thinking in FOUCAULTian (DIAZ-BONE, 2006; GUTTING, 1989; 
WEBER, 2001) and BOURDIEUsian (BOURDIEU and WACQUANT, 1992; 
BOURDIEU, CHAMBOREDON & PASSERON, 1991 [1968]; VANDENBERGHE, 
1999) perspectives, as well as in work that sutures FOUCAULTian and 
BOURDIEUsian relational insights (DIAZ-BONE, 2006). BACHELARD (1968 
[1940]) locates the realization of science in the complex of its assembled 
practices rather than in either progressive rationalism (thought taken to be 
sovereign on its own enlightened terms) or transparent empiricism (the real 
sought to be seen for what it appears really to be). In doing so, he emphasizes 
the significance of artificial technologies through which counter-intuitive findings 
are produced (TRESCH, 2012) and inscribed (LATOUR & WOOLGAR, 1986). 
Core to this concept of artifice is a view of the work of negation in concept 
development: one that rejects continuity (the smooth progression of thought, the 
steady accumulation of what is known) and instead puts emphasis upon the 
ongoing transformation of research practices. [1]
For BACHELARD (1968 [1940]), the naturalization of sedimented research 
experience must be confronted: a philosophy of "no." This concept of negation 
suggests to us an orientation to an ethics of rupture achieved through specialized 
practices that are reflexively oriented to break with their own established forms of 
thought. Central to BACHELARD's vision is an insistence on the development of 
artificial technology (phénoménotechnique). The idea is to move away from 
substantialist to relational accounts, wrenching the world of research from the 
seductive psychological investments of self-evidence whilst also seeking to avoid 
its ossification in theory. The problematic we seek to address here is the 
availability of relational methodology for social research. As anthropologies of 
science have made clear, scientific practice is constituted not only in specialized 
instruments through which new findings can be inscribed (LATOUR & 
WOOLGAR, 1986) but also through the development of rigorous methods such 
as ways of preparing samples that allow counter-naturalistic discoveries to be 
articulated (RHEINBERGER, 2010b). The artifice of rupture is thus, in our 
reading, a matter of praxis. Our focus will be on methods to describe the 
regularities achievable in locally emergent social action rather than appealing to 
an underlying system or totality of conditions of possibility. [2]
In Anglophone writing on social research methodology, BACHELARD's counter-
intuitive orientation to the methodology of scientific research has inspired a 
general orientation that seeks to break with essentialized thinking, rather than 
being taken as suggesting specific lines of methodological development. The 
German schools of FOUCAULTian discourse analysis have sought to give more 
weight to the emphasis on the realization of structuration in the composition of 
human action (DIAZ-BONE, 2006). Whilst there have been powerful but quite 
general expressions of the significance of BACHELARD's ideas for thinking about 
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the social (GUTTING, 1989; WEBER, 2001), the profound importance of his 
thinking for social research is perhaps most evident in the development of 
"reflexive sociology" (BOURDIEU & WACQUANT, 1992; BOURDIEU et al. 1991 
[1968]). This also informed significant developments of discourse analysis in the 
1960s-1980s (HELSLOOT & HAK, 2007) and the influential later development of 
BACHELARDian ideas by DIAZ-BONE (2006, 2013). Informed by this work, post-
foundational discourse analysis has also drawn on BACHELARD (e.g., MARTTILA, 
2013), as has writing on case study research (VENNESSON, 2008). [3]
Of interest to the line of argument we pursue in this article, the early work of 
BACHELARD has also inspired some central anti-essentialist thinking in 
pragmatist traditions of American social research (FUCHS, 2001). However, 
although the promise of his work has been noted in recent literature (ALBERT, 
MYLOPOULOS & LABERGE, 2018), within this pragmatic tradition there has 
been a quite limited range of attempts to articulate specific rupturing technologies 
with which to enable social description, with insufficient regard given to the 
significant European recruitments of BACHELARD's work mentioned above. [4]
It is not only the orientation of the researcher's methodological stance that is at 
stake here. Without sensitivity to relational artifice, methods of coding—not 
unusually given extended space in research articles—often end up appearing 
redundant as what turn out to be more-or-less common-sensical readings of data 
are presented. The price of this is that terms circulating in the everyday, 
saturated with unexamined metaphors, or those decontextualized from context 
and imported uncritically from other disciplines, may reproduce essentialist 
thinking even if the overarching methodology stakes a relational claim. From a 
BACHELARDian perspective, to counter such naturalism within the social 
sciences requires technology with which to make the data become strange. A 
form of dialectic becomes central to methodological endeavor: the need (as the 
more recent work in discourse analysis mentioned above has made clear) to both 
dismantle received categories and find strategies for recomposing social 
description in ways that defeat essentialism. Yet too often this need is not 
confronted. [5]
Where it has been confronted, the most influential route has been for researchers 
to look instead to depth ontology (to identify the real structuration beneath 
surface phenomenon). Previous work developing BACHELARDian insights for 
social research has suggested that without the false-security of naïve empiricism, 
something has to anchor the artifice of relational methodological techniques: 
otherwise relativism would be, it is claimed, the inevitable result. Thus 
VANDENBERGHE (1999) suggests that BOURDIEU's sociology should be 
purified of its "as if" (VAIHINGER, 1965 [1911]) neo-KANTianism in favor of 
ontological support in the philosophy of critical realism. From this point of view, 
trading in the merely phenomenological layer is relativistic and arbitrary as there 
is nothing to constrain interpretation. Contrary to this, taking a pragmatic rather 
than realist point of view, and in line with authors such as BAERT (2005), our 
position is that what matters is the achievement of a workable methodological  
relationality with which to counter essentialism (DUDLEY-SMITH & WHITEMAN, 
FQS http://www.qualitative-research.net/
FQS 21(2), Art. 14, Natasha Whiteman & Russell Dudley-Smith: 
Epistemological Breaks in the Methodology of Social Research: Rupture and the Artifice of Technique
in press). From this position, questions of ontology are redundant. The focus is 
instead on a coherent methodology for the characterization of strategies of social 
action, where the potential arbitrariness of interpretation is avoided as a matter of  
the technique itself. Our view is that this is faithful to our BACHELARDian 
inspiration. The methodological technology through which this might be achieved 
is then our central issue.1 [6]
In this article we suggest that the necessary disruption of proper forms of thought 
highlighted by BACHELARD can be achieved with a specific technological 
intervention: the principled generation and deployment of what we will refer to as 
relational spaces. Here we draw upon and develop the work of DOWLING—
especially his "Sociology as Method" (2009), see also DOWLING (2013). The 
negation a relational space achieves is to counter static and classificatory forms 
of thinking; those that tend to essentialize the substance of the other as a matter 
of being. The positivity it achieves is to exhaust the possibilities of action in their 
local setting in a systematically relational way without any appeal to a generative 
exteriority from which such action is thought to be emergent. As explained below, 
the ordering of the phenomena of the surface of action is taken to be the all there 
is. What then matters is the reality of the ordering (as an artifact of social 
research) as a principled recontextualization of social action. [7]
In what follows, this argument is illustrated by taking a concrete example from the 
field of deviance studies. Through reference to interview data relating to the study 
of illegal file-sharing, we consider the methodological implications of moving from 
a diagrammatic technology that only weakly ruptures established categories 
(BECKER's [1963] use of classificatory spaces when describing marijuana use) to 
an original relational space whose artifice is of a higher power. [8]
BECKER's work provides a very interesting illustration of the methodological 
issue, one that demonstrates the stark difficulty of evading essentialist terms in 
social research. He is motivated by an attempt to rupture (in his case the 
category of deviance) and, in his methodological writing (1998, 2014), repeatedly 
turns to consider the productivity of the orthogonal juxtaposition of binaries in the 
use of diagrams. We share these interests. Yet in BECKER, the use of the 
resulting 2 x 2 table in his analysis of types of deviant behavior ends up itself 
undermining his otherwise pragmatic efforts at rupture: this is because his 
application of the technology marks a relapse to a classificatory logic to which his 
writing is normally opposed. As we will discuss, this tension has been examined 
by other scholars, and indeed by BECKER himself (if less so in his later 
methodological writing). In considering this case, our specific aim is to show that 
diagrams can offer the chance to contract the social into researchable form in a 
1 There is a second, more profound divergence from realist interpretations of BACHELARD in our 
argument. We take it to be an ontological reality of social research that the categories of 
analysis are themselves emergent on the autopoietic social action of the researcher. In our 
view, no claim to exterior warrant (appeals to the intransitive or to the epistemic) can escape 
such action. The repeated ironies in both FOUCAULT and BOURDIEU to the fictional nature of 
their endeavors should, we believe, be taken as intrinsic to their work. It is then the regulation of 
the social research context (its institutionalization) that determines the sense both of truth and 
reality in the outputs of research rather than an elsewhere. 
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way that avoids the reproduction of value-saturated terms: the key is their 
relational design. [9]
In what follows we contrast the BACHELARDian insistence on the need for 
ongoing rupture with the more established notion of epistemological break. The 
productivity, but also challenge, of achieving a relational ethics of rupture is then 
considered. This is illustrated through a discussion of BOURDIEU's appropriation 
of BACHELARD's thinking in his writing on the methodology of social research. 
We then turn to our empirical exemplar of the difficulty of achieving artifice in 
research: the study of deviance. BECKER's use of a cross-product in "Outsiders" 
(1963)—and the limits of this for rupturing with substantive thought—is examined. 
The value of moving from the classification of types to the mapping of emergent 
strategic modes is then demonstrated via reference to WHITEMAN's study of the 
ethics of filesharing. The principles that underpin the technique of relational 
spaces are summarized in the conclusion. [10]
2. BACHELARD and the Process of Rupture
Writing at a time of scientific upheaval when the achievements of science 
seemed to be accelerating (LECOURT, 1975, pp.32-33), BACHELARD (1968 
[1940], 2002 [1938]) presents a vision of scientific thought that challenges 
traditional notions of scientific progress as one of continuity and step-by-step 
development. In its place he emphasizes discontinuities, presenting rupture as 
artificially coaxed events—the rather monolithic phrase epistemological break, 
although now well established in the literature, was one that BACHELARD did not 
use himself (BALIBAR, 1978, p.208). What emerges is a processual image of 
scientific innovation as involving a series of counterintuitive and locally-correcting 
ruptures with previously taken-for-granted ways of thinking (RHEINBERGER, 
2010a). [11]
To achieve this, researchers must overcome what have become known as 
"epistemological obstacles": "the problem of scientific knowledge must be posed 
in terms of obstacles" (BACHELARD, 2002 [1938], p.24). As demonstrated vividly 
in "The Formation of the Scientific Mind" (2002 [1938]), these may take many 
different forms, including what is taken to be unmediated primary observation, 
accepted facts, the misleading power of "explanatory words" (p.31), the way that 
certain scientific ideas take on values and become weighed down "by too much 
psychological concreteness" (p.26), and affectually satisfying but scientifically 
disastrous substantialism. Such obstacles are psychologically seductive and 
apply as much to practicing scientists in their inherited position in the history of 
thought as to laypeople. BACHELARD describes the lure of primary experience, 
for instance, as "bring[ing] with it a profusion of images: it is vivid, concrete, 
natural, and easy. You need only to describe it and marvel. And then you think 
you understand it" (p.29). Yet such obstacles threaten to "close the rupture 
between ordinary knowledge and scientific knowledge and re-establish[...] the 
continuity threatened by scientific knowledge" (LECOURT, 1975, p.135). Failure 
to confront them by engaging in "anxious thought"—scientific endeavor that 
seeks to "break with its own frames" (BACHELARD, cited in WEBER, 2001, p.xiii)
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—leads to thinking that is "encrusted" (BACHELARD, 2002 [1938], p.25). This 
risks a closed refuge in fixed conceptions of knowledge and conservatism rather 
than novelty in thought. [12]
BACHELARD has often been recruited as offering the means to break at an 
epistemic level. This has, for example, perhaps been the central attraction of his 
thought to one reading of ALTHUSSERian scientific MARXism—see, for 
instance, LECOURT (1975). Yet, as HELSLOOT and HAK have suggested, the 
move to scientificity in ALTHUSSER involves a "continuous breaking away from 
'error'" (HELSLOOT & HAK, 2007, §7) after it has been established. This idea of 
continuing rather than epistemic rupture has been a major theme of recent 
readings of BACHELARD's work in non-ALTHUSSERian frameworks 
(KOTOWICZ, 2016; WACQUANT, 2018). These have moved beyond (indeed, 
broken with) an understanding of epistemological break as characterizing 
unpredictable discontinuities in the epistemic order of things, for example those 
suggested by FOUCAULT (1970 [1966]). [13]
There are two elementary reasons why a break at an over-arching epistemic level 
is not possible. First, even if the idea is accepted, most social research relies 
considerably (as in this paper) on ordinary language for its articulation. As such it 
is likely to inherit an unexamined core of metaphors—and these may be non-
consciously selected in the protection of interests generating certainties of 
justification. Very often the adoption of a theoretical category is no defense 
against this: all that is possible is to provide moments of estrangement and 
confrontation (DERRIDA, 1978 [1967]). Second, the idea of monolithic structures 
of cognitive principle—those that suggest the existence of knowledge-as-such 
from which an epistemic break could be wrought—does not withstand scrutiny of 
the bricolaging-mess or "motley" of specialized human practices (TURNBULL, 
2000, p.4). Nor does it recognize the genealogical sensitivity that bodies of 
essentialist thought perpetually appear in new garb; not least in the "mirages of 
the new" declared under the banner of epistemological break itself (DERRIDA, 
1982 [1972], p.140). [14]
In place of large scale epistemic-breaks, a more pragmatic picture is possible of 
ongoing rupture even at a very local level of description (KOTOWICZ, 2016). This 
is a situation parallel to the move from the sense of "paradigm" as over-arching 
principles of cognition in KUHN (1962) to his later emphasis on analogical 
reasoning as case recontextualizes case (KUHN, 1970; see also FORRESTER, 
2017). What matters in the analysis of data, we argue, is that the recognition that 
one empirical circumstance of social action is like another should take relational 
form. To explain this further we briefly discuss BOURDIEU's work as an exemplar 
of relational social research that, for us, embodies an ethics of rupture. [15]
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3. BOURDIEU's Appropriation of BACHELARD in Social Research
In "The Practice of Reflexive Sociology," sociological methods are presented by 
BOURDIEU as "[...] a modus operandi, a mode of scientific production which 
presupposes a definite mode of perception, a set of principles of vision and di-
vision" (1992, p.222). This is underpinned by the BACHELARDian insight of the 
need to exert a break with preconstructed ideas: the given notions and 
presuppositions that constitute reassuring "shared representations" (p.235) of the 
social world as a known/knowable entity. At issue is how naturalized ideas, 
metaphors and perceived facts shape and are reproduced in social research in a 
way that often goes unnoticed and unchecked. [16]
The challenge that BOURDIEU presents to researchers is to engage in "radical 
doubt": to deliberately "construct an alternative perspective on 'common-sense' 
knowledge or 'everyday' events" (ROBBINS, 1998, p.46) by questioning the way 
that research objects and the interpretative schemes deployed in analysis are 
formulated. Achieving this is intensely difficult—"[...] more often proclaimed than 
performed" (BOURDIEU et al., 1991 [1968], p.13)—not least because we cannot 
escape the grip of language, itself "an immense repository of naturalized 
preconstructions" (BOURDIEU, 1992, p.241). [17]
BOURDIEU points to the need for a double break with obstacle-like 
preconceptions that may take both common-sense and scholarly forms 
(BOURDIEU et al., 1991 [1968], p.13). The trouble is that research must take as 
its starting point for scholarly endeavor "blinding self-evidences which all too 
easily provide the illusion of immediate knowledge and its insuperable wealth" 
(ibid.). The researcher must first break with the ruling metaphors of the quotidian 
taken-for-granted: such as when categories such as the social and the individual 
are taken as explanatory objects for their rationalistically privileged subjects. Yet 
the researcher may also be blinded by the self-evidences of the academy, for 
example through armchair or a priori theorization. [18]
BOURDIEU's response, strongly influenced by CASSIRER (1953 [1910])—see 
particularly VANDENBERGHE (1999, 2001)—was to develop an apparatus that is 
relationally conceived: field as the orthogonal juxtaposition of different ratios of 
capital, habitus posited beyond subject-object dichotomies. The content of this 
apparatus is nominalized to a conception of strategy which opposes the idea of 
strategy as involving individual choice (or holistically conceived societal intent). 
This allows a description of the play of contingent trajectories of social positioning 
through which identities are both emergent and valorized as a matter of the 
antagonistic interests staked through them. It is worth recalling that BOURDIEU's 
confrontation of substantialist valorizations of social position through the artifice 
of a relational apparatus is directly inspired by BACHELARD. The resulting 
processual orientation—one that puts key emphasis on the symbolic 
transmutation of the various capitals into sociodicy—is exemplary in 
demonstrating a method of analysis that ruptures methodologically individualistic 
frames of thought. [19]
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There are, however, two central pitfalls when attempting to apply BOURDIEU's 
thought. The first is the reliance on terms that are too easily appropriated in non-
relational ways: for example, "capital"—varieties of which tend to proliferate 
uncontrollably in the social research literature (DUDLEY-SMITH & WHITEMAN, in 
press; WHITE, 2017). The second is the empirical overhead of describing "field." 
This cost is so considerable that many overtly BOURDIEUsian researchers 
simply describe habitus and forms of capital, detaching them from the relations of 
field that, for BOURDIEU, achieve the break from essentialism. Given that 
notions such as capital, with its associations with orthodox economic theory, then 
become something people do or do not have, these researchers are thus at risk 
of falling back into a methodologically individualistic and substantialist framework 
(FINE, 2001) that BOURDIEU himself would reject. [20]
4. Artifice in Method: Two Key Moves
Our argument is that other technologies are available to make such a (double) 
rupture in a way that provides a local grip on the empirical. Rather than the 
totalizing ambition of field/habitus in the description of relational entities as 
extensive as "the field of cultural production" (BOURDIEU, 1983, p.315), our 
interest is in a much more pragmatic and local form: the principled production of 
relational spaces, whose properties will be introduced below. Our claim is that 
these provide an overlooked methodological resource for contracting the 
contingencies of local empirical practice into strategic form. [21]
Such spaces first became clear we believe in the development of social activity 
method (DOWLING, 1998, 2009, 2013). This work involves a sustained attempt 
to produce relational consistency in social description without any assumption of  
a totalizing structure. Before introducing our exemplar, two aspects of this 
methodology (DOWLING's preferred term is "method") need emphasis. [22]
The first is the need to maintain a separation between the principles of 
description and the described. Following DOWLING (2009), we will call this the 
principle of recontextualization. Artifice engineers a separation from the taken-to-
be real in social action. In accordance with this, social activity method stands self-
referentially on its own terms. Attention is placed on the relational and emergent 
shaping of modes of action, and efforts are directed towards the generation of an 
orderly and explicit language for describing these (2009, p.41). As such, the 
method's justification is that it shows itself able to productively re-describe the 
social in ways that make strange the quotidian basis of action. [23]
The second is to follow BOURDIEU (in his recontextualization of semiotics) and 
conceive of the social as a play of strategic action. Yet, rather than requiring the 
panoply of "field" to produce this (with its relations of different proportions of 
capital defining the space of strategic play), social alliance can be seen to be 
emergent on local orderings of action which may (or may not) repeat in future 
action. How such orderings may be conceived is the matter of the following 
sections. [24]
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5. The Study of Deviance 
As AEBI and LINDE (2015) have described, if confronting epistemological 
obstacles "is a difficult task in the natural sciences, it is even more so in the 
domain of the social sciences. Here, the margin of interpretation is wider and it is 
sometimes filled—voluntarily or involuntarily—with ideology" (p.318). It is perhaps 
worth adding that without the discipline of a method that explicitly articulates 
systematic principles of description such filling becomes highly likely. This 
phenomenon is visible in the historical study of deviance, where scholars have 
resisted but also inadvertently reinforced essentialized notions of what is and is 
not acceptable at different points in time. If the crucial concern of relational 
analysis is how to move beyond the classificatory oppositions deployed by 
practitioners in the social, this field of scholarship demonstrates the difficulty of 
resisting categories deployed as a matter of self-evidence. A good way to see this 
is to consider BECKER's use of the technique of cross-products in his study of 
deviance. [25]
5.1 Interrogating previous research—BECKER
In his study of deviant behavior, "Outsiders" (1963; see also BECKER, 1998, 
2014), BECKER challenges lay perspectives that accept "the common-sense 
premise that there is something inherently deviant (and therefore qualitatively 
distinct) about acts that break (or seem to break) social rules" (1963, p.3). The 
homology with BACHELARDian thought—and its close correspondence with key 
themes of pragmatism—is clear in the rejection of moralizing investments in 
social scientific objects through the recruitment of supposedly knowable notions 
of what was deviant and perverse at the time. [26]
BECKER's analysis then combines two dimensions orthogonally: whether acts 
are regarded as deviant by others or not, and whether an act "conforms to a 
particular rule" (1963, p.19). This marks out four "theoretical types of deviance" 
(p.21). These are presented by BECKER in the following table: 
Obedient behavior Rule-breaking behavior
Perceived as deviant Falsely accused Pure deviant
Not perceived as deviant Conforming Secret deviant
Table 1: Types of deviant behavior (adapted from BECKER, 1998, p.174) [27]
In "Outsiders," BECKER carefully establishes what this "set of categories for the 
discrimination of different kinds of deviance" (1963, p.19) does and does not 
relate to. The space organizes a gaze of classification that comes from the point-
of-view of rules of behavior and focuses on actions (and responses to actions) 
rather than people or personalities (p.20). He also suggests the value of the 
schema for rupture in the way that "cross-classifying kinds of behavior and the 
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responses they evoke distinguish between phenomena that differ in important 
respects but are ordinarily considered to be similar" (p.21). [28]
BECKER's space is generalizable to other empirical settings. For example, it 
would be possible to frame illegal file-sharing in these terms. For those seeking to 
impose the hegemonic gaze of copyright possession, the purchasing of content 
would be an example of conforming behavior; the visible hosting activity of a 
peer-to-peer file-sharing site a case of the pure deviant. A mistaken accusation of 
downloading (arising from an accidental click, for instance) would exemplify the 
"bum rap" (p.20) of the falsely accused, while the secret deviant's rule-breaking 
act escapes notice—the successful hack. By drawing out such categories, 
BECKER's cross-product undermines binary conceptualizations of deviancy, 
provoking a consideration of the ways different actions might be constituted as 
deviant/not deviant. It also has the important property of opening the realization 
that tacitly accepted acts of secret deviance may suddenly be reclassified as pure 
deviancy when articulated in a moral panic or during governmental or media 
drives against certain forms of deviance. [29]
Two features of this schema—the focus on actions over persons and way that 
cross-dimensioning enables a "discrimination" of phenomena—are productively 
relational. However, as has often been remarked, BECKER deploys a 
typologizing grammar that generates a focus on objects to be classified 
(ABBOTT, 2001, p.74; SPECTOR & KITSUSE, 1987, p.62) rather than modes of 
action. The use of labels such as "falsely accused" and "secret deviance" seems 
to presume that deviance can be identified independently of the labelling process 
(HAMMERSLEY, 2001, p.94). A symptom of this is that the oppositions taken to 
organize action are very close to those deployed by practitioners. It is little 
surprise that there are already quotidian descriptors available for some types: 
"falsely accused" / "the bum rap." For these reasons the abstraction in BECKER's 
space can be regarded as a classificatory rather than relational. In the end it does 
not escape categorizing people as such: this is principally because the individual 
is taken to be the unit of analysis. [30]
BECKER's response to this criticism configures himself as being much more 
relaxed about such things than his critics (see, e.g., BECKER, 20092). Yet it is 
notable that in his writing on method BECKER (1998, 2014) pays explicit attention 
to the formal workings of such tables and to the disciplined analytical power of the 
relationality at play within them, returning to consider these issues multiple times. 
This includes a focus on the orthogonality of LAZARSFELD's property spaces 
(see BECKER, 1998, 2014) and a transformation of his 2 x 2 diagram into the 
form of a logic table in "Tricks of the Trade" (BECKER, 1998).3 The relational 
completeness of these tables (the idea that, given the combination of the 
oppositions on each axis, no other possibilities are possible) is a particular point 
of methodological emphasis in this work. The valuing of methodological rigor in 
his discussion of the use of such diagrams as logical technologies, can thus be 
2 Our thanks to one of our anonymous referees for directing us to this.
3 Whilst the latter removes the problematically loaded signifiers from Table 1 (replacing them with 
+ and -), yet again the substance of the labels creeps back in—here within the writing.
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seen to rub up somewhat uncomfortably against his expressions of more playful 
indiscipline in defending his own table's limits. Our argument is that relational 
rather than classificatory spaces help to provide such discipline, without closing-
down engagement with the empirical, and in doing so lend support to pragmatic 
social research. [31]
5.2 Copy-fighting: Essentialist positions on illegal file-sharing 
The contemporary "copyfight" relating to the illegal sharing and streaming of 
copyrighted media content is a significant example of where notions of deviance 
play out (CLULEY, 2013; DAVID, 2010; LINDGREN, 2013; YAR, 2006). In recent 
years intellectual property rights have been a highly contested political terrain, 
inhabited by normalized taken-for-granted facts that are shaped by the 
interventions of industry, regulators, educators, and government. Studies of the 
attitudes and perspectives of those engaged in these practices (ANDERSSON, 
2012a, 2012b; ANDERSSON SCHWARZ & LARSSON, 2013; LEWIS, 2015; 
STEINMETZ & TUNNELL, 2013; YU, 2012) have provided an important 
challenge to sedimented normative assertions as to which contemporary 
audience actions are good or bad, rejecting "[...] a priori justifications for or 
against intellectual property protections" (LEWIS, 2015, p.46). [32]
Yet, from the perspective of the methodological issues introduced above, this 
work also demonstrates the difficulties of escaping the double-bind that 
researchers face. The influence of preconstructed artefacts in the methodology of 
this literature is evident in the deployment of concepts and ideas that can be seen 
to be borrowed from the social world (BOURDIEU & WAQUANT, 1992, p.236). 
When the terminology deployed by scholars remains within the register of 
ordinary language, it achieves immediate accessibility. Examples include 
categories of "attitudes for support [for copyright protection]" such as "sweat of 
the brow," "theft," "artist rights" and "protection" (LEWIS, 2015, p.51), references 
to the "tropes" of "mass influence, civil rights and shared community" 
(ANDERSSON SCHWARZ & LARSON, 2013, p.234), to the "mirroring" between 
awareness of individual gratification and the slogan "caring is sharing" 
(ANDERSSON, 2012a, p.597), and the use of the metaphor of "blood donation" 
for understanding file-sharing activity (p.585). This proliferation of value-laden 
terms demands intensive scrutiny (BOURDIEU et al., 1991 [1968], p.23). Without 
this, the danger is of relying on common expressions that too easily supply "the 
appearance of explanation" (p.22). Such individualistically moralizing terms are 
likely to do little more than reflect-back to practitioners the already-known 
(BOURDIEU, 2019). [33]
The imposition of more scholarly theoretical frames runs the opposite risk of 
closing-down the empirical. BOLTANSKI and THÉVENOT's (2006 [1991]) six 
regimes of justification have been particularly influential in file-sharing research 
(ANDERSSON SCHWARZ & LARSSON, 2013; EDWARDS, KLEIN, LEE, MOSS 
& PHILIP, 2015).The recruitment of such frameworks sees scholars revealing the 
theoretical; positioning audience responses within preconceived "orders of worth." 
Thus: "We will see below how a similar notion of progress could be seen to 
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operate as a justificatory regime among our respondents" (ANDERSSON 
SCHWARZ & LARSSON, 2013, p.222). A similar situation has arisen in 
neutralization theory (MacNEIL, 2017; STEINMETZ & TUNNELL, 2013; YU, 
2012). Scholars here claim to have uncovered strategies that are presented as 
being unavailable to, or unknowingly adopted by, file-sharers: "According to their 
verbal accounts, it was found that most of them employed, unknowingly, the 
techniques of neutralization when justifying digital piracy" (YU, 2012, p.374). The 
file-sharers themselves are thus effectively reduced to silence: the real truth of 
their practice is only discernible by the researcher. [34]
Recent research drawing on symbolic interactionist frameworks has emphasized 
the complexities and ambivalences within, and the play between, pro and anti-
filesharing discourses. LINDGREN's (2013) comparative analysis of news and 
blog sites, for example, examines the disruption of hegemonic/counter-
hegemonic positions relating to the filesharing issue, suggesting that "[t]he 
proponents and opponents of piracy can both, simultaneously, be moral 
entrepreneurs and folk devils" (p.1261). From our specifically methodological 
interest, the problem is that the categories that are relied on to dismantle this 
ambiguity and indeterminacy are not relational. Emphasis is placed on discursive 
instability and fragmentation, and the limits of established categories for thinking 
about this: such as the "[difficulty of] categoriz[ing] utterances using the 
representational modes described by Cohen (1972)" (p.1257). Yet, what is not 
confronted is how the researcher might interpret empirical material in a way that 
avoids essentializing. Indeed, the empirical complexity of the discursive 
positioning is demonstrated through a thematic analysis that makes use of 
vernacular labels such as "personal integrity," "democracy," and "file-sharing" 
(p.1256). The result of this is that—despite the very important move to unsettle 
essentialized and sedimented ways of thinking about filesharing—the disruption 
only goes so far. [35]
5.3 Countering classification with relational analysis
Our methodological rupture with Table 1 was achieved by placing our reading of 
BECKER's schema in dialogue both with academic and media coverage of 
filesharing and original interview data that WHITEMAN generated during a 2010 
study of the ethics of contemporary media audiences. In WHITEMAN's project, 
semi-structured qualitative interviews (15 interviews with 7 women and 8 men, 
aged 20 to 54) were used to examine individuals' ethical maneuvering with 
respect to the use of new technologies to access and exchange media content. 
Given the focus of the interviews, which included discussion of illegal as well as 
illicit downloading and online sharing practices, a snowball sampling method was 
used to recruit participants from initial contacts. Such an approach is common in 
the study of sensitive topics and hard to reach populations (ELLARD-GRAY, 
JEFFREY, CHOUBAK & CRANN, 2015). Participants were sought who did not 
self-identify as filesharers given the common focus in the literature on this 
category (a third of the participants had never engaged in filesharing).4 [36]
4 The project was funded by a British Academy Small Research Grant (Grant Reference: SG 54626).
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Moving between these sources provoked a reworking of BECKER's diagram into 
a relational space whilst maintaining an interest in judgment/legitimation. Whilst 
BECKER's (1963) schema orients around the pejorative expression "deviance," 
Table 2 below does not. Rather than types of behavior, the interest is now in the 
emergence of different strategies of discernment within texts—the individual is no 
longer the unit of analysis. 
Objectifying regard on action
Embodied regard on action Positive Negative
Negative Affirming/disaffirming Dismissing
Positive Lauding Disaffirming/affirming
Table 2: Strategies of discernment [37]
The vertical dimension asks whether the reported embodied response to an 
action (either of self or other) is positive or negative. This might be best 
considered as the regard from personal affective norm (an intuitive or habitual 
sense of right or wrong, the moral law in one's heart). From the perspective of 
social theory, this is a matter of purity/impurity: the often tacit modes of 
classification at work in the social. The horizontal dimension, in contrast, 
considers reference to any objectifying regard (the adoption of a rationalizing 
point of view, the indexing of any formally or informally expressed rule, or law). 
Four modes are produced by this juxtaposition. These include two where 
embodied and objectified regards assemble in harmony to reinforce the 
assessment of an action as being either positive (pure) or negative (impure): what 
we have termed lauding and dismissing. [38]
However, the space also indicates the possibility of ambiguity and tension 
between competing regards: dissafirming/affirming and affirming/disaffirming; the 
order of these labels indexed by the arbitrary order of the space (horizontal, 
objectifying; vertical, embodied). When coordinated in this way, these dimensions 
introduce the possibility that a gaze might attribute positive value to an act that is 
regarded as illicit from an objectified (perhaps official) regard, or vice-versa. 
Rationalized deviance can be admired, even though this possibility has not 
always been acknowledged in deviancy studies (HECKERT & HECKERT, 2002). 
Yet in BECKER's schema, the only positive hope for an illicit act would be that it 
would go unnoticed. This is a disaffirming/affirming mode. Equally, it is of course 
possible to find oneself feeling bad about something that is positively objectified: 
affirming/disaffirming. [39]
A further advantage of this methodological approach is that the frame of 
reference can shift according to context. This feature is significant because 
different socio-cultural positions may obviously regard similar actions in different 
ways. The moralizing rejection of the legitimacy of objectively legal forms of 
online sharing in industry-funded anti-piracy educational initiatives, for instance, 
deprives legal filesharing of legitimacy in a mode of affirming/disaffirming. 
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References by VALENTI (2003), the ex-president of the Motion Picture 
Association of America to "file-stealers" "assaulting" the movie industry dismisses 
through both emotive language and appeal to the law. In contrast, the actions of 
a PirateBay co-founder in asserting that people, despite its acknowledged 
illegality, shouldn't "[...] feel ashamed about being file-sharers, but that it is a 
natural and quite common activity online" (HARTLEY, 2010, n.p.) endorses 
filesharing through localized expression in a disaffirming/affirming discernment 
mode. Finally, educational research lauds legal filesharing when it draws attention 
to the embodied competencies that may be acquired through participation within 
an activity that is acknowledged to be legal (e.g., LIVINGSTONE & BOBER, 
2003). If BECKER's diagram reified a framework of types, this space allows 
competing relational positions to speak. [40]
Whilst the space enables the mapping of multiple regards from different sources, 
it can also be used to trace emergent tensions between conflicting regards within 
specific accounts given by a single individual. This can be illustrated by reference 
to an interview from WHITEMAN's study—part of the empirical data that originally 
inspired our reworking of BECKER's space. When a participant who did not 
engage in filesharing activity was asked whether she felt the same way about the 
illegal downloading of films, television and music, she responded:
"The film industry I think is a little bit, it's hard for people to get funding for films, to get 
distribution for films and film to make money and I like cinemas and I like films and 
maybe it's because I see those ads at the cinema saying 'don't download' and 'don't 
illegally watch this' and I wouldn't want to feel like I'm doing something wrong there 
but at the same time if there's a film I want to see and I can't get access to it legally 
and I can watch it, my motivation to watch the film would, I believe, in fact I'm pretty, 
I'm certain, would overcome any ethical qualms." [41]
Initially the reference to the industry warning against participation in illegal activity 
aligns with the emotive "wouldn't want to feel like I'm doing something wrong"—
illegal filesharing is configured as wrong in both objectified and affective terms: a 
dismissing strategy. Almost immediately, however, comes a shift of mode: the 
text acknowledges that filesharing is unacceptable from an objectified regard (the 
rationalization of producers' rights and the presence of the law); but attributes 
positive value to the action in the way that it might satisfy personal feelings of 
desire for content. Such switches in strategy demonstrate the way that an 
emergent order may destabilize within discourse—even within one sentence. [42]
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6. Alterity Effectiveness
The rupturing move from an individualized reproduction of existing classificatory 
types to a relational concept of strategic mode enables a sharp methodological 
critique of the filesharing literature. From LEWIS's (2015) classification of 
attitudes of "support," "resistance," "economic resistance" and "technological 
resistance" towards copyright and file-sharing, to empirically-derived typologies 
such as NUTALL et al.'s (2011) six "tribes" of consumers, lists of key categories 
and themes are ubiquitous in the literature. Indeed, as with our reference to 
capital above, their indeterminacy can be seen in the way that they tend to 
multiply as they are refined. Once different kinds of things start to be articulated 
there is little to constrain their enumeration. [43]
Relational spaces are more modest than such lists. They offer up what is going 
on with respect to an empirically observed but theoretically defined juxtaposition 
of oppositions and nothing else. The rationale for modesty is important. The 
resulting diagrams do not constitute a storage system of boxes in which to throw 
data: the challenge is to find levels of analysis at which multiple strategies within 
a given text might be organized. Rather than reduce informants to types, analysis 
becomes scalable from short phrases upwards. Any individual may respond in 
multiple modes. In addition, because the dimensions of analysis are founded on 
polar opposites, they produce logical closure—as BECKER himself described in 
his writing on method, given the particular combination of binaries, there are no 
other possible outcomes when dimensions are set together in this way. Thus, 
relational spaces also draw attention to the possibility of unexpected strategies 
that might not have been empirically observed or predicted from a common-
sense or scholarly perspective. This also sheds light on BOURDIEU et al.'s (1991 
[1968], p.100) emphasis on the potential productivity of relationality in revealing 
the unnoticed and/or unacknowledged ambiguities of scholarly presuppositions. [44]
The focus on strategic action moves away from the security of the everyday 
entities referenced in the filesharing scholarship when the empirical is 
approached thematically—through concepts such as "motivations, ideologies and 
attitudes toward intellectual property" (LEWIS, 2015, p.46) and "pro-download" 
and "anti-download" categories' (STEVENS & BELL, 2012, p.756)—towards a 
focus on the emergent strategies by which ethical stances are constituted. This 
provides a way to disrupt essentialized notions that many of those working in this 
field appear to promote. It was certainly productive that BECKER was 
fundamentally concerned with the process of action. Indeed, one merit of 
BECKER's schema is that it maps out possible trajectories—moving from one 
type of deviancy to another. However, as we have indicated, it isolates three 
nouns; there is only one gerund, and that is of a stable-state ("conforming"). 
Classificatory spaces—although commonplace in social research—seem often 
held together by such insinuations of substance. Relational spaces, in contrast, 
bring to fruition BECKER's insight of the value of orthogonality in relational 
thinking by eliminating substance altogether. [45]
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The methodological achievement of distance of this kind has the benefit of 
enabling analytical frameworks to achieve a wider applicability than those tied 
closely to specific phenomena. The collapse of putatively theoretical codes into 
their local empirical referents in the filesharing literature described earlier limits 
the applicability of this work to the specificities of one empirical context or activity. 
Thus, as LEWIS (2015) acknowledges, the transferability of his coding frame 
may be restricted "to other research sites that share particular contextual factors" 
(p.48). The fact that empirical phenomena are moving targets (particularly those 
relating to technological developments) provides another pragmatic reason for 
seeking such distance. [46]
There are certainly challenges to generating relational spaces. One of these is 
the difficulty of selecting terms. In developing Table 2, for instance, we found 
ourselves tempted to turn to words that bear the seductive essentialism that we 
have warned against in this article. Without a highly formal language one cannot 
entirely escape such preconceptions. We found that keeping the somewhat 
unwieldy dyads affirming/disaffirming and disaffirming/affirming maintained a 
focus on the ambiguity in the data and prevented us from imposing ready-made 
ideas. The terms we have used may not be immediately accessible or appealing; 
but they index the complexity of strategic moves that become discernible through 
this method. The modesty we have indexed above can also be seen as a 
limitation: the space we have introduced is unable to map text that shows 
indecision or indifference, for instance. To capture this, further diagrams would be 
required. The completeness that relational spaces offer is thus narrowly defined; 
on the other hand, this gives them considerable analytical grip. [47]
7. Conclusion
"The sociologist's struggle with spontaneous sociology is never finally won, and he 
[sic] must conduct unending polemics against the blinding self-evidences which all 
too easily provide the illusion of immediate knowledge and its insuperable wealth" 
(BOURDIEU et al., 1991 [1968], p.13). 
In this article we have argued for the value of technique in achieving artifice in 
method. More specifically, we have suggested the use of a robust diagrammatic 
relational approach in seeking to obtain a rupturing otherness in the analysis of 
data. The pursuit of such otherness is, we believe, vital if research is to avoid the 
specter of the preconstructed. [48]
The exploration of artifice in method could, of course, be extended beyond the 
parameters of the theoretical and methodological ground that we have covered. 
As has been suggested more generally by ALBERT et al. (2018), 
BACHELARDian considerations, despite their significant influence to date, still 
have the potential to develop a rich line of methodological inquiry. There is an 
urgency in the need to reignite these ideas, not just because their implications for 
social research are profound, but also because they challenge much of what is 
currently produced within the academy. [49]
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We have argued that the development of relational spaces in social activity 
method provides one way of achieving necessary otherness in social research. If 
one so wishes, such spaces can be thought of as real entities. Yet we struggle to 
see what such a categorization would achieve. What is of critical significance is 
the productivity of these spaces when describing the social. They are themselves 
part of a social activity (the methodology of social activity method). As such they 
are regulated by explicit principles. First, allow only continuity/discontinuity as the 
foundation of principled description (the semiotic inheritance). Second, specialize 
recognition of these differences according to a sense of emergent and processual 
social action: see that action as strategic, as intending the formation of 
alliance/opposition. Third, juxtapose (as a principle of methodology) oppositions 
as they play against each other. [50]
In our analysis of interview data, we sought to demonstrate these principles in an 
applied way. Our analysis configured the establishing of positions in relation to 
notions of deviance as an intensely social activity involving the dynamic formation 
of sometimes conflicting alliances/oppositions. The strategies of discernment 
diagram articulates a relational view of this, and in doing so challenges the 
attribution of solidity and security to conceptualizations of perspectives on an 
activity like filesharing that are taken as self-evident in some academic literature. 
The method presented opens up what might elsewhere be configured as 
substantive attitudes or opinions grounded in the everyday. It also rejects the 
formulation of over-arching formalist structure to present a more relational 
account of the ethics of media audiences. [51]
At the same time, Table 2 does not only have use value for scholars interested in 
filesharing activity. As we have discussed, because—like other relational spaces
—it is not tied to the empirical specificity of one context, it has the potential to 
move: in this case from the field of criminology or audience research to other 
areas of academic interest. Indeed, it may prove of use to map any area in which 
issues of value or legitimacy are the focus of research. [52]
The juxtaposition at work in spaces such as Table 2 ensures that no binary can 
accrue inadvertent essentialized investments—there are always four, not two 
modes in each space (or to the power of two if further dimensions are added). 
There is then explicit and principled regulation of description that ruptures the 
phenomenological self-evidence of the categories of quotidian social description. 
There is no supplementary appeal to depth, which would ultimately involve the 
idea that the researcher could somehow know the conditions of their own critique. 
The status of relational spaces is resolutely analogical, not totalizing. What 
results is a diagrammatic ordering of modes of action that is relationally 
conceived rather than relations between people—a matter of technique, not 
networking. Thinking of relationality in this way enables a fine-grained 
"constructive description" (DOWLING, 2009, p.48) of social process that is 
separate from the action it regards. [53]
This article used BECKER's typology of deviance as a way of demonstrating the 
move from classificatory to relational spaces. As we have discussed, it is of great 
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interest to us that in his methodological writings, BECKER places considerable 
emphasis on the potential technological productivity of cross-tabulation: sensing 
perhaps that this is a way of undoing the ontological gravity of dualisms, but also 
providing an explicit framework through which the principles of description can be 
made visible to the reader of social research. In closing, it is worth noting that 
BECKER's work is an example of where the methodological problem at hand—
the difficulty of rupturing with preconstructions—was confronted. BECKER was 
aware (or made aware) of it and has discussed it directly (if not completely 
resolving the tensions evident in his work). Yet too often, this insidious problem is 
not confronted, not acknowledged in research writing. This is despite the attention 
that has been given to BACHELARD's writing elsewhere. Our suggestion is that 
greater attention still needs to be placed on the practical implications of this issue. 
Going further, we would suggest that whilst the technology presented here bears 
a family resemblance to other familiar analytical devices, the potential of this 
specific form of relationality is considerable for those actively seeking 
methodological rupture. [54]
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